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Abstract: Using multilevel social network and standard statistical analysis, this paper compares
three levels of a state-level lobbying network - the network of individual lobbyists, the network
of lobbying organizations, and the client or principal network - in order to provide a more
nuanced understanding of the structure and dynamics of state-level interest groups. North
Carolina is unusual in that it provides public longitudinal data since 1993 covering all three
levels of relations. By engaging in this comparison, we hope to further parse the key
characteristics of the network in order to understand its evolving structure. Specifically, how do
different levels of the lobbying network evolve and change? How do key network
characteristics differ across network levels? How are changing connections over time between
lobbyists, lobbying organizations, and their clients associated with key political variables such as
perceived influence?
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Introduction and Overview
Using a unique longitudinal dataset, this project is focused on the structure and evolution of
lobbying networks at the state level. We use the data from 1993 on lobbying organizations in
the State of North Carolina as a case study. Examining the structure of lobbying relationships in
North Carolina in terms of different levels of lobbyist relations, this project assesses whether
and how political networks change and whether different levels of lobbying relationships
exhibit different characteristics.
We study three levels of relationships within the interest group community, from the level
of individual lobbyists to lobbying organizations to principals who hire individual and
organizational lobbyists. Our overall focus is not confined to one level (e.g., principal networks
that are affiliations through common lobbying organizations) but to relations that span levels
such as when principals employ individual lobbyists. Within and across these levels we are
interested in relations change and how patterns of relations matter for political activity.
While the ostensible topic concerns state level lobbying, this paper is also about structure
and time. If social network methods permit us to take a relational view of political life, then we
have to ask questions such as: What does the structure of relations look like? And more
importantly, what does it mean for political activity? In addressing these questions, we have to
consider the role of time. Relationships build over time as actors interact and develop trust,
norms, and common perspectives. So in this paper, we are concerned not just with the
presence or absence of relations among lobbying entities, but also with the explanations and
interpretations of such relations.
This paper begins by providing a review of prior research, and the review has two foci. First,
we begin by reviewing the state of the literature on political activity at the state and local level,
particularly the interrelationships among interest groups across jurisdictions. Second, we
summarize prior political work from a social network perspective, which provides a rationale for
examining politics from a relational perspective. The review of prior literature provides a
foundation for our arguments, which suggest that lobbying communities are dynamic and that
lobbying entities develop relations as a function of this dynamic process. After a discussion of
the data sources and methods, we present our results from descriptive social network analysis
and dynamic modeling analysis. We conclude this paper by discussing future work and
extensions as well as connecting this project to the concept of political influence.
Prior Research
State-Level Lobbying
The structure of political activity has been a focus of social scientists for at least a couple of
decades (Laumann and Knoke 1987). However, as Baumgartner and Leech (1998) noted, little
work has been done at the state level. This project is not only focused on the state level but
also on relations between local and national firms. To the best of our knowledge, little research
has explored the connections between interest groups represented at both the national and
state levels.
Wolak, Newmark, McNoldy, Lowery, and Gray (2002) created a dataset of state-level
lobbying registrations across all 50 states in 1997. They found that while the lobbying
techniques show some convergence, communities of special interest groups remain
predominantly local. Similarly, de Figueiredo (2004a and b) and Boehmke (2008) model the
2

variations of state-level interest group activity. In Boehmke’s (2008) study, he notes that states
that permit direct initiatives have significantly larger interest group populations. Evidence
supports the proposed mechanism that state-level initiatives generate mobilization of
previously dormant groups, which are usually local in nature. This result might obtain because
initiatives are typically state-specific, they foster larger interest group communities that create
openings for niche groups, and as initiatives typically create groups with a short-term focus,
higher rates of group exit create openings for new groups.
However, recent research suggests significant linkages between the federal and state levels.
Baumgartner, Gray, and Lowery (2009) model how federal policy activity stimulates lobbying
activity in the states, and their analysis finds that “strong linkages exist between federal policy
activities and the subsequent activities of groups in the states” (2009: 13). They document that
the pathways that connect federal and state-level policy activity are many and distinct. For
example, they find evidence that federal and state policy actors are responding
contemporaneously and directly to ongoing events. They also find a substitution effect in which
congressional hearings in one year dampen or stimulate state lobbying registrations in another
year, the effect of dampening or stimulation depending both on the kind of state legislature
and policy area. However, the “precise mechanisms and timing associated with these factors
should be the object of further research” (2009: 13).
Gray and Lowery (1996) have used a population ecology framework to measure and model
the growth and development of interest group communities at the state level. Two ideas from
the population ecology literature are especially relevant: the density of interest group
communities and the diversity of such communities. These concepts are best addressed
through the use of network theory and analysis.
Networks
Social network theory and analysis has a long tradition in political research. For example,
the resource mobilization approach uses the patterned links among interest groups to show the
structure coalitions, cleavages, and competitive relations among such groups and how political
actors are linked to resources (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Wellman 1988; Knoke 1990). Other
political scientists have recognized the value of stable relationships in policymaking. For
example, lobbying groups that have a long tenure or track record are often successful with
bureaucratic lobbying because such a group will likely be of use to the agency in the future
(Costain, 1978).1 Informal social relationships in lobbying exist and can serve useful ends
(Chubb, 1983; Milbrath, 1963). However, the political science literature generally has not
explored the mechanisms and implications of social relationships and social norms among
lobbyists. Instead the models used in political science either have an undue reliance on
structure, such as through the ‘iron triangle’ or subgovernment model, or view political actors
as atomistic in nature (Lowi, 1969; Heclo, 1978; Heinz et al., 1993; Hula, 1999).
In contrast, a relational perspective stressing social network analysis may be useful in
getting at social reality in “dynamic, continuous, and processual terms” (Emirbayer, 1997: 281).
1

In contrast, a number of organized interests are known best for their outsider reputations as either
dissidents or non-specialists. “These groups appear to contribute little of direct value to specific policy
decisions because the costs of making their proposed policy changes are very high” (Browne, 1989).
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Social network analysis studies the behavior of individual actors at the micro level, the pattern
of relationships at the macro level, and the interaction between the micro and macro levels
(Stokman, 2004). Networks facilitate information transmission (Granovetter, 1973) and assist in
providing cooperation and collective action (Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000).
There are two fundamental threads to analyzing power or influence in terms of a lobbying
network. First, the network itself represents a macro-level picture of the influence of lobbyists
on political or policy activity. An extremely dense network structure may provide the potential
for great power, while a more loosely coupled structure will be less likely to provide the
foundation from which to exert significant influence (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). Second, the
power of the overall network can be distributed amongst its component parts in a variety of
ways. This micro-level distribution of power is concentrated in the relational space between
particular actors within the system, and can be more or less equally distributed (Hanneman and
Riddle, 2005). In social network theory, these two related, but distinct threads are captured by
the concept of “embeddedness”.
The embeddedness perspective in network analysis “stresses the role of concrete personal
relations and structures (or ‘networks’) of such relations in generating trust and discouraging
malfeasance” (Granovetter 1985: 490). “’Embeddedness’ refers to the fact that economic
action and outcomes, like all social action and outcomes, are affected by actors’ dyadic (pairwise) relations and by the structure of the overall network of relations.” (Granovetter 1992:
34). The micro-level concept of embeddedness emphasizes the dyadic or relational properties
of the network. Reciprocating ties are generally asymmetric, differing in content and intensity,
but ties are usually reciprocated in a generalized way (Wellman 1988). Ties link network
members indirectly as well as directly such that any tie between two actors must be defined
within the context of the overall network.2
Relational embeddedness typically has direct effects on individual action and leads to trust.
Information from a trusted source is cheaper, richer, more detailed, and known to be accurate
precisely because continuing relations often become overlaid with social content that carries
strong expectations of trust and abstention from opportunism (Granovetter 1985). Embedded
exchanges make expectations more predictable and reduce monitoring costs, They also allow
‘thick’ information exchange of tacit and proprietary know-how, and joint problem-solving
arrangements that stress flexibility and feedback (Uzzi 1997).
In contrast, macro-level structural embeddedness typically has more subtle and less direct
effects on action. Multiple independent paths that link pairs of structurally cohesive actors
help information flow among organizations in a way that facilitates politically similar activity
(Moody and White 2003).3 Structural embeddedness, which arises from sharing one or more
foci of activity with others, is less under the control of individuals and is more stable than the
dyad (Feld 1997).
2

“In practice, many ties are with network members whom one does not like and with whom one would not
voluntarily form a twosome. Such ties are involuntary in that they come as part of the network membership
package” (Wellman 1988: 41).
3
“In saying this I draw on the principle that to the extent that a dyad’s mutual contacts are connected to one
another, there is more efficient information spread about what members of the pair are doing, and thus better
ability to shape that behavior. Such cohesive groups are better not only at spreading information, but also at
generating normative, symbolic, and cultural structures that affect our behavior” (Granovetter 1992: 35).
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Our Arguments
Interest group communities are diverse and dynamic, exhibiting flows of people and
organizations. Within this fluid environment, we argue that a policy community is partly
characterized by durable and informal relationships of participating lobbying organizations, but
the strength of the relationship is a property of the group rather than the constituent
organizations (Moody and White 2003). Lobbying organizations will vary in terms of their
specific strength of ties to each other, but the group has a unique level of cohesion that should
persist over time.
Moreover, relationships arise out of shared needs to find reputable services, information
and key resources. These needs contribute to an increasing level of group-wide relationships as
reputations develop and spread in a way that fosters ties between entities. Markovsky and
Lawler (1994) identify ‘reachability’ as an essential idea to group embeddedness, meaning that
we should be able to trace an actual path from one group member to any other member. As
new relations develop out of shared interests, multiple and independent paths between two
lobbyists can be traced through the group (Moody and White 2003).
But relations might only exist at one point in time: For example, lobbyists might come
together once, and only once, to discuss five legislative areas of interest, and then depart.
Therefore, time also becomes part of the equation. When we see the same lobbyists working
together over time, we could say that they occupy a set of positions within a web of close-knit
relationships. Therefore, we would expect that those lobbyists and principals who operate in a
policy community over time would increasingly develop a stable set of shared interests with
other, similarly situated entities relative to those who do not work consistently in a policy area
over time. Moreover, people often know each other, but when they do not, they search for
reliable markers of quality (Spence 1976; Podolny 1993) that will provide some assurance that
the relationship or exchange will be beneficial rather than harmful, that the relationship will
continue into the future (Hardin 2002).
With these perspectives in mind, we will test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: In a dynamic policy environment, long term participants in a policy community
are more likely to create relationships with each other than with relative newcomers
Hypothesis 2: In a dynamic policy environment, relationships are more likely to be higher for
entities that have higher reputations for trust and/or ability.
Data and Methods
Because our focus is on relations within a community of policy actors, we rely primarily on
social network concepts and methods. Statistical procedures are used to assess the significance
of associations, and we use a new modeling method for longitudinal network data. In using
different methods, we hope to provide as complete a picture of a state-level lobbying
community as the limited data will allow.
In addition, the data is multilevel in nature. We have data on principal organizations
(organizations that hire or employ lobbyists), lobbying organizations (organizations that hire
themselves to principals or that are self-representing), and individual lobbyists. The long-term
5

aim of this project is to assess the community of lobbying in North Carolina on each of these
levels.
Our primary data source is mandatory lobbyist registration information collected and
maintained by the Office of the North Carolina Secretary of State. Lobbyists – individuals and
organizations – are required to register with the Secretary of State and file periodic reports.
Periodic reports must identify clients that hire lobbyists. These reports are publicly available,4
but they do require data manipulation and recoding. Reports were downloaded for the
following time periods: the two year periods of 1993-94; 1995-96; 1997-98; 1999-00; 2001-02;
2003-04; 2005-06. Beginning in 2007, reporting requirements switched to annual reporting
such that we have data for 2007 and 2008.5
Since the 1980s, the North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research (NCCPPR) has polled
members of the legislature and the lobbying community as to the most influential individual
lobbyists. An example illuminates the process. For the 2004-05 legislative session, NCCPPR
conducted the survey during the first three months of 2006. All 50 state senators and 120 state
representatives, 442 registered lobbyists (including the lead state agency legislative liasons),
and 16 state capital news correspondents were asked to choose the top ten most influential
lobbyists during the prior two-year session from a list of all registered lobbyists. The overall
response rate was 48%, though there was wide divergence in the response rate of different
groups: 68% of representatives; 72% of senators; 39% of lobbyists; and 63% of news
correspondents responded that year. There is no publicly available data on the distribution of
the respondents compared to the overall sample. The rankings are calculated by aggregating
the number of times each lobbyist is listed as amongst the top ten and then constructing a list
of the top 50 individuals ranked in terms of perceived influence.
We use this data from 1993 to 2007 to construct a measure of a lobbying organization’s
reputation for influence during each two-year legislative session. First, we construct a total
influence variable by reversing the coding such that the scales are reversed – the number 1
lobbyist is coded as a ‘50’ and the 50th ranked lobbyist is coded as a ‘1’. In this way each
lobbyist is rated on a point scale from 1 to 50 with 50 representing the most influential lobbyist.
Each individual lobbyist’s ranking is attributed to the organization that employs him and if an
organization has more than one influential lobbyist, the scores are added together.
In terms of analysis, we first provide descriptive statistics for the different lobbying entities
in North Carolina, including an exposition of the nature and structure of lobbying relations at
the organizational and individual levels. Social network analysis will also be used to illustrate
the pattern of relations among lobbyists, among principals.
Because we have longitudinal social network data, we use the “actor-oriented” statistical
network model as expressed in the software program SIENA6 (Simulation Investigation for
Empirical Network Analysis), which was developed to describe and explain the development of
closed networks over time (Snijders, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2005; Snijders & Van Duijn, 1997). The
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http://www.secretary.state.nc.us/lobbyists/thepage.aspx.
We understand that the time periods do not completely match up in terms of duration, and we hope to remedy
this disjuncture in future iterations of the project. However, we do not believe that different durations detracts
from the main points of this paper.
6
A free copy of the latest version is now available in R and from the website at http://stat.gamma.rug.nl/siena.html.
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model evaluates the changes in the networks as a result of the rational actions of the lobbying
organizations.
Each actor maximizes a utility function based on substantive arguments and constructed
such that it represents the costs and rewards for an actor to be in a specific state (e.g., creating
or dissolving a tie) at a moment in time. The individual utility function is modeled as a random
component because it includes elements that are not represented in the model by measured
variables. Therefore, the utility function contains statistical parameters that have to be
estimated from real observed data.
For each actor, a set of admissible actions is defined in that lobbying organizations may
start, consolidate, or dissolve a tie to another organization. Actors only control their own
decisions to create or dissolve links and do not force other actors to change their links. In
general, the choice of action for actor i at time = t, ait, is based on a number of independent
variables. If an action can be described as a function of one or more substantive utility
arguments, it is assumed that the actor is able to determine the expected effects of future
actions. Therefore, each decision is associated with a change in utility, ΔUit(a). Because the
choice of action can also be based on utility arguments that are not explicitly modeled in the
utility function and because of measurement and/or specification errors, it is assumed that ego
chooses the action that maximizes ΔUit(a) + Eit(a), in which Eit(a) is random error term. Under
certain conditions on the distribution of Eit(a), this leads to the model:
Pit =

exp(ΔUit(a)/σ)
ΣAa=1 exp(ΔUit(a)/σ)

This model states that in cases in which the expected change in utility is approximately the
same for all actions ego’s choice is more or less entirely based on pure chance. However, if,
compared to other actions, one action is associated with a relatively large increase of expected
utility, the probability that ego chooses this specific action is also relatively large.
In summary, we observe the networks of lobbying entities at different points in time and
collect information regarding a number of fixed and varying individual and dyadic attributes.
However, because we have no information about what happens between observations, the
model simulates what happens in between the observation points using the random utility
model. The organizational actions that make the network develop from one structure into
another are the core of the simulation procedure.7
SIENA estimates the model based on a maximum likelihood estimator using the method of
moments, implemented as a continuous-time Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. The model
first calculates likely starting values for the parameters of all the variables. SIENA next simulates
the choice process based on the starting values, compares the resultant simulated network
with the observed networks of actual ties, and adjusts values to reduce differences between
the observed and the simulated data. The model then uses a number of simulations to
determine the frequency distribution of predictions, which then are used to calculate standard
errors for the final parameter values.
7

The software that is used for the estimation is called SIENA, which is part of the network software package
STOCNET and can be downloaded for free from http://stat.gamma.rug.nl/siena.html.
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In this model, we examine the changes in ties between principals and individual lobbyists
for 3 time periods (1993-4, 1995-6, 1997-8). Because the modeling process is computationally
intensive, we limit the analysis to the set of individual lobbyists who are consistent players in
the policy community in at least 7 of the 8 total time periods.
While we tried a number of parameters, including betweeness centrality, cycles of relations,
and outdegrees, the model converged best when using four parameters (in addition to the
standard density parameter that must always be included): the ‘popularity’ of the individual
lobbyist as shown by his or her indegrees, an assortativity effect in which high outdegree
principals are tied to high indegree lobbyists, the number of time periods that a principal is
represented by lobbyists, and the reputation of the individual lobbyist as evidenced by being
named as influential in a particular time period.
In terms of the hypotheses, we would expect that positive and significant results for the
number of time periods for principals would provide evidence for hypothesis 1. That is, ties are
more likely to be formed between long-term player-principals and long-term lobbyists. For
hypothesis 2, we expect that lobbyists with lots of indegrees and/or that have reputations as
influential have the requisite markers of quality that will attract principals. Moreover, the
assortativity effect means that high outdegree principals are more likely to form relations with
high indegree lobbyists. In this way, we are assuming that higher numbers of degrees or ties
are indicators of quality such that principals and lobbyists with similar numbers of ties will seek
each other out.
However, both hypotheses assume a crowded and dynamic policy environment. Therefore
the first part of our analysis describes the interest group environment in North Carolina.
Analysis
Lobbying in North Carolina
We first provide some numerical and graphical representations of the networks of lobbying
firms and hiring principals in North Carolina. Figure 1 below shows over time trends in terms of
the number of organizations and persons lobbying in North Carolina. Whether individuals,
lobbying organizations, or principals, we are seeing large and increasing numbers at each level
although the number of lobbying organizations has shown more fluctuation.
However, these numbers do not adequately describe the entire lobbying environment so
we next discuss each level in more detail.

8

Figure 1: Number of Individual Lobbyists, Lobbying Organizations, and Principals in North
Carolina, 1993-2006

Individual Lobbyists
Table 1 below indicates the total number of individual lobbyists over all time periods. A
relatively small number of individuals are consistent players in the lobbying world as only 113
or 4.6 percent have lobbied in all 8 time periods. The vast majority of individual lobbyists only
do this kind of work for one legislative session. Thus, we see a lot of movement in and out of
the lobbying community over time.
Table 1: Number and Percentage of Individual Lobbyists by Time Periods Spent Lobbying
Time Periods
Number
Percentage
1
1,298
52.81
2
470
19.12
3
241
9.8
4
127
5.17
5
97
3.95
6
72
2.93
7
40
1.63
8
113
4.6
In Figure 2 below, we see a network map of individual lobbyists who are affiliated to each
other via common principals in 2007-08. Components are color-coded, and one can see a giant
component in red with a large number of small components scattered throughout. This is a
common pattern across time as the number of individuals belonging to the main component
has fluctuated from 42 to 49 percent since 1993.
9

Figure 2: Network of Individual Lobbyists Affiliated through Principals, 2007-08

From Figure 3, we can see that the average number of ties per individual lobbyist is small,
fluctuating between 2 and 2.5, although the trend is on increasing ties over time. This suggests
that perhaps a relative few lobbyists have a large number of ties and many individual lobbyists
have 1 or 2 ties to principals.
Figure 3: Number of Individual Lobbyists and Average Indegree Per Time
Period, 1993 through 2006.
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Lobbying Organizations
In terms of numbers, our data includes 2,624 organizations that lobbied or were
represented by lobbying organizations in North Carolina over the 1993 through 2008 time
period. Of these, 2,292 were principals and 1,129 were lobbying organizations. The reason
that the number of principals and the number of lobbying organizations collectively are larger
than for the entire dataset is that many organizations have, at one time or another, been both
principals and lobbying organizations. In total, 797 organizations have been in both categories
(although not necessarily at the same time).
But how does multilevel lobbying fit into the structure of the North Carolina interest group
community? To answer this question, we first consider the role of time. For organizations in
North Carolina, the distribution reflects a large number of organizations that are active for a
short period of time but with a significant number of groups that operate across all time
periods.
Figure 4: Number of Lobbying Organizations by Number of Time Periods Represented in
North Carolina (1993-2008)(n=1,129)

What we can see from the distribution in the table is that organizations can be
characterized generally as either repeat players or one-shot players (Galanter, 1974).
With these characteristics of the lobbying community in mind, we now consider the overall
shape of the network. Table 2 below provides a different set of cross-tabulations, this time
between time spent lobbying in North Carolina and the number of times that an organization
was selected as influential. To be clear, this reflects the mere selection for being influential, not
the relative ranking of influence. The table shows that most organizations (91.2 percent) are
never chosen as influential. Of those organizations chosen as influential, the distribution
appears bimodal: Many organizations are consistently influential, and many are influential only
one or two times. Time, of course is an important factor—an organization cannot not be
influential if it is not actively involved in advocacy. But it is striking that a small subset, about 2
11

percent of lobbying organizations, are consistently viewed as influential in North Carolina
politics.
Table 2: Tabulation of Time Periods Lobbying in North Carolina and Influence Rankings, in
percentages (1993-2008)(n=1,119)
Number of Times Chosen as Influential
Time in
NC
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Total

0
27.6
17.4
9.8
5.5
7.0
5.0
4.1
4.0
10.8
91.2

1
0.1
0.0
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.2
1.3
3.0

2
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.7
1.6

3
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.1
0.3
0.8

4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.5

5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.5

6
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.3
0.5

7
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
1.0
1.2

8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.8
0.8

Total
27.7
17.4
10.6
5.7
7.2
5.5
5.1
4.6
16.2
100.0

First, we note that the presence of a giant component is not restricted to one time period.
Table 3 summarizes the size of the giant component over time. Generally 60 percent of
lobbying organizations active in any particular year are members of the main or giant
component.
Table 3: Organizations in Main Network Componet, 1993-2008 (frequency and percent)
Time Periods
93-94

95-96

97-98

99-00

01-02

03-04

05-06

07

08

Number of Orgs in
Main Component

443

545

565

538

602

500

610

557

497

All Organizations

735

827

888

831

868

827

972

974

887

60.3%

65.9%

63.6%

64.7%

69.4%

60.5%

62.8%

57.2%

56.0%

Pct in Main Component

What is holding this main component together? In Figure 5 below, we show the average
number of in-degrees (normalized to reflect the variations in the networks over time) for forhire lobbying organizations over the entire time period of the data. The general trend is of an
increase in the average number of in-degrees held by these for-hire lobbying firms. In other
words, relations may be concentrating within a small group of organizations.
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Figure 5: Average In-Degrees Per For-Hire Lobbying Organization, 1993-2008 (n=450)

Principals
The last group that we review is principals, which are those entities that either hire
lobbyists. Figure 6 below provides a graphical breakdown of the percentage of principals in
each legislative session by number of time periods that they support lobbying activities. The
top group in the figure are principals that are involved in all time periods considered in this
study. In general, this group of long-term principals account with some variation for a third of
all principals in any one time period. At the other end of the spectrum are principals that are
active for very short time periods. Those principals that are only active for 1 or 2 legislative
sessions make up approximately 30 percent of all principals in any one time period. Much like
the environment for individual and organizational lobbyists, the policy environment for
principals can be characterized as dynamic.

13

Figure 6: Distribution of Total Lobbying Time of Principal Organizations by Legislative Session

Figure 7 indicates that despite the fairly dynamic nature of the principals community, the
vast majority of principals are connected to each other, based on common affiliations with
individual lobbyists, as approximately 85 percent belong to the main component. The other
line in Figure 7 shows that the average degree of principals has fluctuated between 7 and 22
degrees. As Figure 1 above illustrated a sharp increase in the number of principals, the
fluctuation may reflect the addition of new principals in more recent time periods.
Figure 7: Average Degrees of Principals and Percent in Main Component, 1993-2006
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The Distribution of Lobbying Relationships and Power Laws
The foregoing discussion suggests a process of concentration occuring in the networks. The
fact that North Carolina lobbying has a substantial minority that are ‘repeat players’ and a large
number that are ‘one-shot players’ (Galanter 1974-5) may translate into a particular
distribution in the relationships among organizations. Such a concentration of ties in a small
group of entities may indicate the presence of a scale-free network or a structure of ties that is
characterized by a power law distribution (Barabasi 1999; Aldrich and Kim 2007). A power law
distribution of ties is characterized by many organizations have few or no ties to others while a
small minority have a large number of ties. The network is therefore sparse in terms of its
connections. While there are different ways to check for power law distributions (see Barabasi
et al. 2002), log-log plots of the distribution of ties or degrees in network parlance are often
used to check for power law distributions. If the general distribution of ties exhibits a fat right
tail (e.g., many organizations with little or no ties to othes with a minority of organizations
holding many ties to others), we would expect a power law distribution. For example, Figure 8
gives the in-degree distribution for the 2007-8 network.
Figure 8: Kdensity Distribution of In-Degrees for the 2007-8 Lobbying Organizations

Transforming the general distribution to logarithmic scales should convert the fat tail to a
linear relationship. Figure 9 provides log-log plots for the incoming ties to all North Carolina
lobbying organizations for all years as well as for the distribution of the sum of ties across all
years. Each graph has a scatter of dots for the actual distribution as well as a line that is fitted
for the distribution. Looking at the individual years, some distributions exhibit a better fit to
the power law distribution than others (such as the graph for 2007-8, which was the example
network in Figures 4 through 8 above). However, all graphs exhibit, to a greater or lesser
degree, a power law distribution, and this is certainly true for the last graph, which is the sum
of all in-coming ties across all years.
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Figure 9: Log-Log Plots of In-Degree Distributions (Directed Ties) for North Carolina Lobbying
Organizations, 1993-2008
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A somewhat similar picture can be found at the individual lobbyist and principal levels.
Figure 10a provides a log-log plot of the individual lobbyist indegree distribution for 1993
through 2008, and Figure 10b shows the logged distribution of the total outdegrees for
principals for 1993 through 2008.
Figure 10b: Principals
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However, note that in many of the graphs in Figure 9 that the ‘tail’ of the distribution does
not follow the fitted line all the way down to the x axis but rather curves down. The scale-free
quality of the network is truncated even in cases in which the actual values fit very well to the
line. This indicates that the best linked organizations are not getting all the links. Kogut, Urso,
and Walker (2007), writing in the context of the venture capital industry, suggest that actors in
a truncated scale-free network may tend to recreate prior ties rather than link to the most
linked actors. Given the importance of trust in lobbying relationships, it is perhaps not
surprising, then, that prior relationships might act as a break on the development of a pure
scale-free network in an interest group community.
Why is characterizing the network of lobbying organizations as scale-free important? Such
a characterization indicates a ‘winner-take-all’ quality to lobbying. Certain organizations seem
to garner the majority of business from principals. As discussed in the conclusion, this has
implications for the business of lobbying, representation, and influence.
Results of Dynamic Modeling Analysis of “Long-Term” Individual Lobbyist-Principal Network:
In this section we discuss changes in network structure over time with regard to the
relationships between individual lobbyists and principals. Because of the challenges of
modeling large longitudinal networks, we limit the analysis in two ways. First, we focus on only
those individual lobbyists who are consistently registered as lobbyists, that is, registered for at
least 7 out of 8 legislative sessions over the 1993-2008 time period. Second, we consider only 3
waves of data. Below are Figures 11a through 11c, which are network maps of these
relationships for 1993-4, 1995-6, and 1997-8. In each figure, color indicates a component, and
the size of the node indicates whether the individual lobbyist was listed as influential for that
legislative session.
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Figure 11a: 1993-4

Figure 11b: 1995-6

Figure 11c: 1997-8

The three figures provide a similar story. In each network, there is a giant component in
which the majority of individuals and principals are connected (in each case, the giant
component is colored blue and can be seen as giant arc around the other components).
Table 6 below presents the results of the dynamic modeling of the change in the network
structure among long-term individual lobbyists (registered for at least 6 legislative sessions) and
principal organizations that hire the lobbyists. Because the model is computationally intensive,
we have so far only modeled changes in network structure for three waves of data, which are
the 1993-94, 1995-96, and 1997-98 legislative sessions. As the data is directional in that a tie
from a principal to a lobbyist indicates a hire, we are looking to see if changes in ties across the
network reflect basic processes in lobbying relationships. As discussed above, these processes
include whether more ‘popular’ lobbyists attract more business, whether highly connected
principals (with lots of outdegrees) tend to hire lobbyists with lots of indegrees (out-in
assortativity), whether a lobbyist’s public reputation as influential is an attractor for principals,
and whether higher outdegree principals tend to hire more lobbyists.
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Table 4: Parameter Estimates for Long-term Individual Lobbyists and Principals,
1993-1998 (3 waves)
Parameter
Rate Parameter Period 1
Rate Parameter Period 2
Outdegree (density)
Indegree (popularity)
Out-In Degree Assortativity
Influence of Alter
Principals’ Total Time Lobbying

Coefficient

Standard Error

0.287
0.291

0.025
0.024

-7.732
0.060
0.575
0.973
0.274

0.231
0.027
0.088
0.348
0.042

t Value

-33.472
2.222
6.534
2.796
6.524

p Value

<0.001
0.077
0.001
0.038
0.001

n = 850

The coefficients in Table 4 indicate changes in network ties for a change in the parameter,
all other parameters held constant. We find support for the hypothesized processes. The
‘popularity’ of individual lobbyists as shown in the number of indegrees does have a positive
and statistically significant coefficient of 0.06, but this coefficient is relatively small and the
significance is not very strong. But it does suggest a process of high indegree lobbyists getting
more business – The rich getting richer.
The coefficient for out-in assortativity is 0.575 and is statistically significant. Thus,
principals with more outdegrees (that is, with many lobbying hires) are more likely to hire
additional lobbyists with more indegrees. So there is a bit of a homophily process in which high
degree principals and lobbyist are attracted to each other.
In addition, the influence alter coefficient is 0.973 and also significant. Thus, lobbyists who
have been recognized by their peers as influential are significantly more likely to attract
principals than lobbyists who are not so recognized.
Finally, the total time spent in the policy community by principals also shows positive and
significant results with a coefficient of 0.274. Recall that we only included individual lobbyists
who were long-term players so these results indicate that long-term players, both principals
and lobbyists, tend to create ties over time.
Discussion
This paper has shown some important features of the interest group community at the
state level (at least for one state!). First, all levels in the lobbying community – individuals,
organizations, and principals – exhibit a dynamic environment that is generally becoming more
numerous.
We also found that the network of lobbying entities seems to exhibit scale-free properties
at the state level. That is, within the main component of the network in each time period, a
small number of entities hold a disproportionate number of ties to other entities. This finding
seemed to appear in each time period at least for lobbying organizations.
With this environment as a backdrop we argued that entities seeking to create relations and
affiliations will look for markers of quality and trustworthiness. In order to make an attempt at
answering this question, we modeled the changes in a network of long-term individual lobbyists
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and principals that hire them. We found that high indgree lobbyists attracted ties in general,
that high degree lobbyists and principals tended to attract to one another, that long-term
principals created ties, and that lobbyists publicly identified as influential attract ties. We think
that these results suggest that in entities looking to influence policy through working with
others look for signals of reliability.
However, these results are preliminary. There are a number of unfinished tasks associated
with this project. We intend to continue collecting data and coding additional variables that
can augment the analysis presented here. For example, we would like better organizational
and interest attributes. Moreover, we will extend this work to principal organizations and
individual lobbyists. In addition, a goal of this project will be to continue to explore how the
structure of relationships changes over time. Finally, we intend to collect data from other
states in order to see whether the findings in this paper can be generalized.
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